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Introduction
According to Safechecks, embezzlement has been the top-ranked financial crime for
more than 30 years. Recent studies indicate that employee embezzlement accounts for
the majority of employer losses through employee fraud. The size of the losses is also
staggering. In 2003 PricewaterhouseCooper did a global survey and found that the
average loss per entity for asset misappropriation in a two-year time period was
$1,388,731.
Even in South Carolina cases of fraud in local government have been on the
increase. At Sumter School District 17 the collusion of several employees and outside
vendors resulted in the embezzlement ofmillions of education dollars from our children's
future, while South Carolina continues to pridefully hold the title of49th in education.
Occupational fraud and abuse is a widespread problem that affects every
organization. Occupational fraud can be defined as: ''The use of one's occupation for
personal enrichment through the deliberate misuse or misapplication of the employing
organization's resources or assets." It can be as simple as pilferage of company supplies
or as complex as sophisticated financial statement frauds. All occupational fraud
schemes have three key elements in common. The activity:
• Is held in or conducted with secrecy,
• Violates the perpetrator's fiduciary duties to the victim organization, and
• Costs the employed organizCl,tion assets, revenue, or reserves.
There are three major types of occupational fraud:
*Corruption
*Asset Misappropriation
*Fraudulent Statements (which include fmancial statement schemes)
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*Corruption involves fraudsters wrongfully using their influence in a business
transaction in order to procure some benefit for themselves or another person, contrary to
their employer or the rights of another. It includes the following activities: conflicts of
interest, bribery, illegal gratuities, and economic extortion.
*Asset misappropriation involves the theft or misuse of an organization's assets.
It includes larceny, fraudulent disbursements, and skimming of cash, and the misuse and
larceny of inventory and all other assets.
* 'Fraudulent statements involve falsification of an organization's financial
statements. It includes overstating revenues and understating liabilities or expenses. It
also includes significant unusual transactions. These significant transactions are outside
the normal course of the entity's business or appear unusual.
According to Joseph T. Wells, CFE, CPA, in his book Occupational Fraud and
Abuse, embezzlement is a special type of fraud: an employee not only steals the assets
but that person also violates a fiduciary duty to hold the assets for another where there is
trust or a high degree of good faith. To file a charge of embezzlement there must be a
relationship such as that of employment or agency between the owner of the money and
the defendant. In addition, the money alluded to have been embezzled must have come
into the possession of the defendant by virtue of that relationship and there must be an
intentional and fraudulent appropriation or conversion of the money.
The elements of embezzlement are as follows:
• The embezzled funds came into possession of the wrongdoer by reason of
employment or position of trust;
• Need or greed: unusual financial strains or other motivations creating the
mindset to steal; .
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• Revenge: employees feel wronged, and see employers as unjust, corrupt or
discriminatory;
• Thrill seeking: taking the opportunities, employees steal because they can;
• Denial: some employees rationalize their thefts as temporary loans or as
entitlements based on past under-compensation; and
• Addiction: dishonest employees often continue to steal until they are caught.
The purpose of this project was to survey local governments in South Carolina about
occupational fraud in their organization. The survey was conducted from July 2003 -
August 2003. A total of 107 surveys were mailed to local governments. Twenty-six
were mailed to cities and town, twenty-five to counties, twenty-five to school districts,
and thirty-one to special purpose districts in South Carolina. The intent of this project is
that this information may be used as a helpful tool for local governments in South
Carolina to prevent occupational fraud.
Participants
South Carolina has approximately 269 cities and towns; 46 counties; 87 school districts;
and 181 registered special purpose districts. South Carolina Act No. 488 defines "special
purpose district" as:
"Any district created by an act of General Assembly or pursuant to general law
and which provides and local governmental power of function including, but not
limited to, fire protection, sewerage treatment, water or natural gas distribution,
recreation, and means any rural water district authorized or created under the
provisions of Chapter 13, ofTitle 6."
Out of 107 surveys mailed out only 50 were returned: 11 from cities/towns, 9 from
counties, 14 from school districts, and 16 from special purpose district. Out of the 50
surveys returned 44% of local governments indicated that an act of occupational fraud
had been committed within their organization in the last fifteen years.
Page 3 of30
Digitized by South Carolina State Library
Fraud Incidents Fraud Fraud
Summary Results Yes % No % Totals
Cities/Towns 5 23% 6 21% 11
Counties 4 18% 5 18% 9
School Districts 9 41% 5 18% 14
Special Purpose Districts 4 18% 12 43% 16
Totals 22 100% 28 100% 50
Impact of Corporate Scandals
In today's times the mention of the following names may be followed up by an
interesting response: Enron, WorldCom, Tyco, Merrill Lynch, Arthur Anderson. The
response will usually be "Scandal," "Scandal," and "Scandal." On October 16, 2001,
Enron Corporation announced a $35 million decrease in stated earnings and a $1.2 billion
loss of shareholder eguity due to an exclusion of three partnerships from past financial
statements. In addition, Enron announced in November 2001 that an additional $500
million in' earnings were overstated. On December 2, 2001, Enron filed for Chapter 11
protection, making it the largest bankruptcy in U.S. history. Enron used accounting
tricks, manipulations of the market, and imaginary profits to present itself as the premiere
energy trader.
While Enron was one of the largest companies to restate its earnings, it was not
the first major corporation to do so. In April 1998, Cendant Corporation, a provider of
travel, real estate, vehicle, and financial services, announced that it had inflated its
earnings by $115 million. The next day Cendant'sstock dropped by 46 percent. In July,
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Cendant issued another restatement, admitting to an additional $400 million in
overstating earnings. Cendant executives and employees pleaded guilty to filing
fraudulent financial reports. More importantly, these employees stated that they did so
under the explicit orders of company executives.
In June 2002, Tyco International's CEO Dennis Kozlowski was arrested for
taking more than $600 million from his company. In addition, Kozlowski forgave more
than $100 million in loans to company executives for "relocation" costs, which included
luxury yachts, extravagant parties; personal artwork, and multimillion-dollar homes.
These practices caused investigators to re-examine Tyco's past filings. The end result
was a negative restatement of earnings of $382 million on September 26, 2002. Also in
June 2002, Xerox, long viewed as a stable company, revealed $6.4 billion in overstated
earnings. An SEC investigation revealed inflated revenues of $3 billion. This resulted in
a $10 million fine, which· was the largest ever levied by the SEC for fmancial reporting
violations.
These corporate scandals had a dramatic impact on investor confidence. This
increasing number of scandals was an indication of a pattern of accounting irregularities.
The corporate scandals uncovered many institutional problems within the accounting
industry. In 1993, consulting fees made up 31 percent of revenues at the Big Five
accounting firms (Arthur Anderson, Deloitte & Touche, Ernst & Young, KPMG, and
PricewaterhouseCooper). By 1999, when the corporate scandals began to break, for the
first time accounting firms were earning more money from consulting than from audits.
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This increasing reliance on consulting within the accounting industry created conflicts of
interest between auditing units and consultants. Auditors came under increasing pressure
to produce audit reports that supported their finn's consulting advice, to insure a major
funding stream for the accounting firms.
The Cost ofFraud
In August 2002 the Brookings Institution released a policy brief entitled "Cooking the
Books: The Cost to the Economy," the brief sought to estimate how much the recent
corporate scandals and accounting irregularities contributed to a decline in wealth, and in
turn, economic output. The decline caused by the scandals would be part of the larger
decline in wealth arising from the financial market's decline from its 2000 peak.
Brookings estimated that the corporation scandals reduced GDP by 34% in the first year.
It is important to remember that it is impossible to calculate the cost fraud imposes on the
economy because not all fraud is detected or reported. In addition, there is no
organization charged with accumulating data on fraud offenses, and few studies have
been done on the subject.
In their "2002 Report To The Nation, Occupational Fraud and Abuse," from the
Association of Certified Fraud Examiners estimates that occupational fraud loss
accounted for $600 billion dollars of the gross domestic product.
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DISTRIBUTION OF DOLLAR LOSSES
Each respondent was asked about th¥ total dollar loss caused by the schemes they
reported on. As the following chart illustrates, half of the frauds in the survey cost their
victims less than $10,000.
Dollar Loss Range Cities / School Special Purpose % of
/ % of Cases Towns Counties Districts District Totals Cases
Less than $10,000 2 0 5 4 11 50%
$10,000 - $50,000 4 3 2 0 9 40%
$50,000 - $100,000 0 1 0 0 1 5%
Over - $100,000 0 0 1 0 1 5%
Totals 6 4 8 4 22 100%
THE METHODS OF FRAUD
One of the purposes of this report was to determine exactly how fraud is accomplished
and to classify the offenses by the methods used to commit them. Each case in the study
was reviewed and classified according to the Occupational Fraud Classification System.
As mentioned earlier, the three major categories of occupational fraud are asset
misappropriations, corruption, and fraudulent statements. Once each scheme was
classified, comparisons were made on the costs and frequency of each scheme type.
Special
Cities / School Purpose % of
Scheme Types Towns Counties Districts Districts Totals Cases
Asset
Misappropriations 5 2 7 4 18 78%
Corruptions 1 2 1 0 4 18%
Fraudulent
Statements 0 0 1 0 1 4%
Totals 6 4 9 4 23 100%
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Asset misappropriations were by far the most common of the three schemes, accounting
for nearly 80% of the cases reported. Asset misappropriation schemes can be subdivided
based on the type of asset that is stolen or misused. Typically, the asset that is most
commonly targeted by employees is cash. Almost 100% of the asset misappropriation
cases in this report involved the theft of cash. Schemes involving non-cash assets (such
as inventory, and equipment) were very unlikely to occur.
Cash schemes can be divided into three categories:
• Fraudulent disbursements, in which the employee causes the organization to
disburse funds through some type of skim or device (common examples are
submitting false invoices or time sheets),
• Skimming, in which cash is stolen from an organization before it is recorded
on the books of the organization, and
• Cash larceny, in which cash is stolen from an organization after it has been
recorded on the books of the organization.
Of these three categories, fraudulent disbursements were reported most frequently.
Fraudulent disbursements are comprised offive categories:
• Billing schemes, in which the employee causes the organization to issue a
payment by submitting invoices for fictitious goods or services, or invoices
for personal purchases,
• Payroll schemes, in which an employee causes the organization to issue a
payment by making false claims for compensation,
• Expense reimbursement schemes, in which an employee makes a claim for
reimbursement of fictitious or inflated business expenses,
• Check tampering, in which the employee converts the organization's funds by
forging or altering a check on one of the organization's bank accounts, or
steals a check the organization has legitimately issued to a vendor, and
• Register disbursement schemes, in which an employee makes false entries on
a cash register to conceal the fraudulent removal of currency.
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DURATION OF SCHEMES
How long does the typical fraud scheme run before it is detected? Based on the surveys
received the majority of fraud schemes lasted one year or less. The data indicated that
20% of the schemes lasted one to two years. Based on the data present below there was
only one fraud case that lasted over five years.
Special
Cities / School Purpose %of
Length of Schemes Towns Counties Districts Districts Totals Cases
Less than 1 Year 3 3 5 1 12 60%
1 to 2 Years 2 1 1 0 4 20%
2 to 3 Years 0 0 1 1 2 10%
3 to 4 Years 0 0 0 0 0 0%
4 to 5 Years 1 0 0 0 1 5%
Over 5 Years 0 0 1 0 1 5%
Totals 6 4 8 2 20 100%
DETECTING & PREVENTING FRAUD
INITIAL DETECTION OF FRAUDS
One of the obvious ways in dealing with fraud is detecting it soon as possible. Local
governments were asked how the frauds they encountered were initially discovered. As
the data presents, the most common method of detection was a tip from an employee.
This suggests that effective reporting and good, open communication from employees to
management can have a position effect on fraud detection.
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Special %
Cities / School Purpose of
Initial Detections Towns Counties Districts Districts Totals Cases
By Accident 0 0 0 1 1 5%
Tip from 4 1 3 2 10 45%
employee
Internal Audit 2 0 3 0 5 23%
External Audit 0 1 1 0 2 9%
Anonymous Tip 0 0 0 1 1 5%
Other 0 2 1 0 3 13%
Totals 6 4 8 4 22 100%
FRAUD PREVENTION MEASURES
Local governments were asked, based on their own expertise, which measures are most
helpful in preventing fraud in their organizations. By far, a strong system of internal
controls was viewed as the most effective measure in preventing fraud.
Citles
-- - .
Special %
Prevention / School Purpose of
Measures Towns Counties Districts Districts Totals Cases
Segregation of 2 1 2 0 5 27%
Duties
Spot Checks 1 0 0 0 1 6%
Surprise Audits 1 0 1 0 2 11%
Dual Controls 0 0 2 0 2 11%
Communications 0 1 b 0 1 6%
Internal Controls 0 2 2 3 7 39%
Totals 4 4 7 3 18 100%
THE PERPETRATORS
Local governments were asked about the perpetrators who committed the cases of fraud.
The data help profile fraud perpetrators and shows how certain factors affect the size of
the losses.
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POSITION OF PERPETRATOR
One of the best indicators of the size of the loss in an occupational fraud scheme is the
position of the perpetrator within the organization. Typically, schemes committed by
managers and executives cost more. This relationship could be expected, since higher-
level employees have a greater degree of control over and access to the organization's
assets. The following data show that rank: and file employees committed most of the
schemes.
Special %
Position of Cities / School Purpose of
Perpetrator Towns Counties Districts Districts Totals Cases
Chief 0 0 1 0 1 4.5%
Financial
Officer
Clerk 2 3 1 3 9 41%
Athletic 1 ·0 0 0 1 4.5%
Director
Supervisory 1 0 ·0 0 1 4.5%
Secretary 0 0 2 0 2 9%
Bookkeeper 0 0 3 0 3 14%
Director of 0 1 0 0 1 4.5%
EMS
Customer 0 0 0 1 1 4.5%
Service Rep.
Program 0 0 1 0 1 4.5%
Director
Principal 0 0 1 0 1 4.5%
Mayor 1 0 0 0 1 4.5%
Totals 5· 4 9 4 22 100%
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GENDER OF PERPETRATOR
Special %
Gender of Cities / School Purpose of
Perpetrator Towns Counties Districts Districts Totals Cases
Male 2 4 2 1 9 41%
Female 3 0 7 3 13 59%
Totals 5 4 9 4 22 100%
The gender data point out some interesting information. The higher number of female
perpetrators in the school districts is simply a reflection of fact that most teachers are
females. The most interesting bit of information has to do with the fact that 100% of the
perpetrators were male from the counties. That could be a reflection of South Carolina
government and politics. Because of South Carolina's conservative politics, county
governments are still dominated by males with the old aristocrat mentality.
AGE OF PERPETRATOR
Cities Special %
Age of / School Purpose of
Perpetrator Towns Counties Districts Districts Totals Cases
18 to 25 Years Old 1 0 1 1 3 15%
26 to 35 Years Old 0 1 3 0 4 20%
36 to 45 Years Old I I 0 3 5 25%
46 to 55 Years Old 0 2 3 0 5 25%
Over 56 Years Old 3 0 0 0 3 15%
Totals 5 4 7 4 20 100%
Some studies have suggested that younger employees commit most of the occupational
crimes; these data do not support that point of view. The data show that the age of the
perpetrator is evenly distributed over the young and old. Because older employees tend
to occupy senior positions and have more access to assets there is a greater loss per case.
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LEVEL OF EDUCATION
Level of Special %
Education of Cities / School Purpose of
Perpetrator Towns Counties Districts Districts Totals Cases
High School Diploma 2 2 5 2 11 58%
Associate's Degree 0 0 0 2 2 10%
Bachelor's Degree 1 2 1 0 4 21%
Master's Degree 0 0 2 0 2 11%
Master's Plus 0 0 0 0 0 0%
Totals 3 4 8 4 19 100%
Studies have shown that in general there is- a link between higher levels of education and
the amount of the loss.
CONVICTION STATUS OF PERPETRATOR
The following chart shows that only a little over halfof the perpetrators were charged and
prosecuted for their crimes. The data show that school districts prosecuted more often
than any other local government entity in South Carolina. In contrast cities and towns
were least likely to prosecute for fraud. One possible explanation for this is that cities -
and towns tend to be political animals more than school districts. In addition, there is
probably more public support for prosecuting individuals who might be taking away
funds from children.
Conviction Special %
Status of Cities / School Purpose of
Perpetrator Towns Counties Districts Districts Totals Cases
Yes 1 3 7 1 12 55%
No 4 1 2 3 10 45%
Totals 5 4 9 4 22 100%
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NO LEGAL ACTION
Local governments were also asked if the perpetrator was not charged, why not?
Special %
Cities / School Purpose of
Why not char2ed? Towns Counties Districts Districts Totals Cases
Immaterial 2 1 1 1 5 50%
Not enough evidence 1 0 1 2 4 40%
Board decision 1 0 0 0 1 10%
Totals 4 1 2 3 10 100%
ANTI-FRAUD MEASURES
Local governments were asked about controls that existed within their organizations.
We asked if the fraud schemes succeed because of a lack of controls?
Special %
Preventative Cities / School Purpose of
Controls? Towns Counties Districts Districts Totals Cases
Yes 1 2 5 3 11 52%
No 4 2 3 1 10 48%
Totals 5 4 8 4 21 100%
Ifno, did they succeed because preventive controls were ignored?
Were Special %
controls Cities / School Purpose of
i2Ilored? Towns Counties Districts Districts Totals Cases
Yes 4 2 3 0 9 90%
No 0 0 0 I 1 10%
Totals 4 2 3 1 10 100%
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POST-FRAUD REACTIONS
Was the organization able to recover any of the losses?
Special %
Losses Cities / School Purpose of
Recovered? Towns Counties Districts Districts Totals Cases
Yes 4 3 6 3 16 73%
No 1 1 3 1 6 27%
Totals 5 4 9 4 22 100%
Local governments were also asked if the organization was not able to recovery any of
the losses, why not? Two of the school districts stated there was not enough proof and
one county stated that it was not worth it.
ASSET MISAPPROPRIATION
Based on my survey of local governments, 85% of the incidents involved asset
misappropriation. Because I would like for this report to be a tool for local governments
to prevent occupational fraud, I will discuss asset misappropriation in more detail and
ways to prevent it. There are three major categories of asset misappropriation schemes:
cash receipts, fraudulent disbursements of cash, and theft of inventory and other non-cash
assets.
Cash Receipts
Cash is the focal point of most accounting entries. Cash schemes can either be on-book
or off-book, depending on where they occur. Cash receipts schemes fall into two
categories: skimming and larceny. Skimming is the theft of cash that has not yet been
recorded on the books, while larceny is the theft of cash thathas already appeared on an
organization's books.
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Skimming
Skimming is one of the most common fonns of occupational fraud. Because skimming is
known as "off-book" fraud these schemes typically leave no direct audit trail. Off-book
means that the funds are never recorded with the possibility the victim organization may
not be aware that the cash was ever received.
Sales skimming is the most basic skimming scheme. It occurs when an employee
sells goods or services to a customer, collects the customer's payment, but makes no
record of the sale. The employee pockets the money received and never turns it over to
his or her employer. One fonn of sales skimming is register manipulation. Register
manipulation involves an employee ringing a "no sale" or other non-cash transaction to
cover up the theft. The false transaction is entered on the register so that it appears a sale
is being rung up. The perpetrator opens the register drawer and pretends to place the cash
he or she has just received in the drawer, but pockets the cash instead.
Another fonn of skimming is theft of checks received through the mail. Checks
received through the mail are a frequent target of employees seeking illegal gains. Theft
of incoming checks usually occurs when one employee is in charge of opening the mail
and recording the receipt of payments. This employee simply steals one or more
incoming checks and never posts them to the customers' accounts.
Example
A mailroom employee stole over $2 million in government checks arriving through the
mail. This employee simply identified and removed envelopes delivered from a
government agency known to send checks to the company. Using a group of
accomplices acting under the names of fictitious persons and companies, this individual
was able to launder the checks. [Joseph T. Wells, Occupational Fraud and Abuse,
(Obsidian, 1997).]
Page 16 of30
Digitized by South Carolina State Library
The final skimming scheme I would like to discuss is check for currency
substitutions. Because of obvious reasons intelligent criminals prefer to steal currency
rather than checks. Currency is harder to trace than a check, a cashed check will be
returned to the person who wrote it, and a check is difficult to convert into cash. To
avoid these complications criminals who steal unrecorded checks will frequently
substitute them for receipted currency. For example, if an employee skims a check worth
$200, he or she can add the check to the day's receipts and remove $200 in currency.
The total receipts for the day will match the amount of cash on hand, but payments in
currency are replaced by the check.
Example
An employee responsible for receipting ticket and fine payments on behalf of a
municipality stole incoming revenue for nearly two years. When this individual received
payments in currency, she issued receipts, but when checks were received she did not.
The check payments were therefore unrecorded revenue, perfect for skimming. These
unrecorded checks were placed in the day's receipts and an equal amount of cash was
removed. The receipts matched the amount of money on hand except that payments in
currency had been replaced with checks. [Joseph T. Wells, Occupational Fraud and
Abuse, (Obsidian, 1997)] .
Lapping is one of the most common schemes of receivable skimming. Lapping has also
been called the "robbing Peter to pay Paul" scheme. It is the crediting of one account
through fake payments from another account. Suppose an organization has three
customers, A, B, and C. When A's payment is received, the perpetrator steals it instead
of posting it to A's account. Customer A expects that his or her account will be credited
with the payment made. If the payriient has not been posted by the time A's next
statement is mailed, he or she will see that the payment was not applied to his account
and will certainly complain.
Page 17 of30
Digitized by South Carolina State Library
To avoid this, the perpetrator must take some action to make it appear that the
payment has been posted. When B's check is received, the perpetrator posts this payment
to A's account. Payments now appear to be up-to-date on A's account, but B's account is
now behind. When C's payment is received, the perpetrator applies it to B's account.
Unfortunately, this process continues indefinitely until one of three things happens: (1)
someone discovers the scheme, (2) restitution is made to the accounts, or (3) some
concealing entry is made to adjust the accounts receivable balances.
Example
A clerk working for a government agency committed a lapping scheme that involved the
theft of more than 150 customer payments, causing a total misappropriation ofmore than
$30,000 in government funds. This perpetrator stole taxes, fees and other incoming
payments from customers to cover his personal expenses. When a customer's payment
was stolen, the documentation on that payment would be hidden until a later payment
was received. The later payment would be applied to the earlier customer's records. As
the rotating schedule of applying and misapplying payments became more and more
complicated, the perpetrator insisted on exerting more and more control over the
receipting process. He insisted on handling all incoming mail, preparing the deposit and
delivering the deposit to the bank so that he could continue to delay the posting of
payments. The fraud was detected in large part because several customers complained
that they had not received confirmation of their payments, even though their checks had
cleared months earlier. [Joseph T. Wells, Occupational Fraud and Abuse, (Obsidian,
1997).]
Prevention of Skimming Schemes
Internal control procedures are the keys to preventing skimming schemes. An essential
part of developing control procedures is management's communication to employees.
Sales entries and general ledger access controls should include documented policies and
procedures.
Page 18 of30
Digitized by South Carolina State Library
Other general controls include:
• Appropriate segregation of duties and access control procedures regarding
who makes ledger transactions will be followed,
• Transactions must be properly recorded as to amount, date of occurrence, and
ledger account, and
• Proper safeguard measures must be adopted to protect physical access to the
account systems and assets of the organization.
Skimming Controls
Here are some audit program questions that may be red flags:
• Does someone independent of the cashier, accounts receivable clerk, or other
accounting employees who may initiate or post journal entries open mail?
• Does the employee who opens the mail:
Place restrictive endorsements ("For Deposit Only") on all checks
received?
. Prepare a list of the money, checks, and other receipts?
Forward all remittances to the person responsible for preparing and
making the daily bank deposit?
• Is a lock box used?
• Do cash sales occur? If yes:
Are cash receipts pre-numbered?
Is an independept check of pre-numbered receipts done daily and
reconciled to cash collections?
• Do cash refun.ds require approval?
• Are cash receipts deposited intact daily?
• Are employees who handle receipts bonded?
• Is the accounts receivable bookkeeper restricted from:
Preparing the bank deposit?
Obtaining access to the cash receipts book?
Having access to collections from customers?
• Is the cashier restricted from gaining access to the accounts receivable records
and bank and customer statements?
• Are safeguard in place in areas where cash is handled physically?
• Is the person who makes postings to the general ledger independent of the
cash receipts and accounts receivable ftmctions?
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Larceny
Cash larceny is defined as the intentional taking of an employer's cash (including both
currency and checks) without the consent of the employer. Because every company must
deal with the receipt, deposit, and distribution of cash, the vulnerability to a cash larceny
scheme is great.
Obviously, most cash larceny schemes occur at the cash register. The high
activity level at the register and the possibility that there may be several employees
handling cash can serve as a cover for the theft. In a larceny scheme the funds that the
perpetrator steals have already been reflected on the register tape.
Detection of Cash Larceny
Cash receipts and recording process analysis is the key to detecting a cash larceny
scheme. Areas of analysis may incl:ude:
• Mail and register receipt points
• Journalizing and recording of the receipts
• The security of the cash from receipt to deposit
Prevention of Cash Larceny
The primary prevention of cash larceny is segregation of duties. It is inappropriate for
one person to have control over the entire accounting process (e.g. authorization,
recording, and custody).
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Each of the following duties and responsibilities should ideally be segregated:
• Cash receipts
• Cash counts
• Bank deposits
• , Deposit receipt reconciliation
• Bank reconciliation
• Posting of deposits
• Cash disbursements
\
Many fraud schemes are continuous In nature and reqUIre ongoing efforts by the
employee to conceal it. Mandatory job rotation is an excellent method of detecting cash
fraud. By establishing a mandatory job or assignment rotation, the concealment element
is interrupted. Mandatory vacations are also a good tool in preventing larceny. It is very
important that during the employee's absence, another individual perform the normal
workload of that employee. The purpose of mandatory vacations is lost if the work is
allowed to remain undone during the employee's time off. Finally, surprise cash counts
are very useful in fraud prevention. It is important that employees know that cash will be
counted on an unscheduled basis.
Fraudulent Disbursement
Fraudulent disbursement involves an employee making a distribution of company funds
for a dishonest purpose. Examples of fraudulent disbursements include forging checks,
the submission of false invoices, falsifying timecards, and setting up fictitious vendors.
One important thing to point out is that on their face, fraudulent disbursements do not
appear any different from valid disbursements.
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For instance, when an employee iuns a bogus invoice through the accounts payable
system, the victim organization cuts a check for the bad invoice right along with all the
legitimate paYments it makes. Some frauds are based on the amount, recipient, or
destination ofthe paYment, but the method of paYment is legitimate.
Fictitious Refunds
This is especially important for local governments who collect business license fees. It is
very common for refunds to be issued for overpaYments because for the initial year the
fee is based on an estimate of gross receipts. Another area of fraudulent refunds is credit
card fraud. When purchases are made with a credit card rather than cash, refunds appear
as credits to the customer's credit card rather than as cash disbursements. Dishonest
employees process false refunds on credit card sales in lieu of processing a normal cash
transaction. One benefit of the credit card method is that the perpetrator does not have to
physically take cash from the register and carry it out of the store.
In a typical credit card refund scheme, the perpetrator rings up a refund on a credit
card sale, even though the merchandise is not actually being returned. The employee
then credits his or her own credit card number rather than the customer's. The result is
that the cost of the item is credited to the perpetrator's credit card account.
Other credit card refund schemes involve perpetrators processing refunds to the
accounts of other people, and receiving a portion of the refund as a kickback. For
example, a person needs $100. That person goes to the store where a friend is a teller and
the teller processes a credit of $150 to his or her account.
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The "customer" then goes to an ATM machine and withdraws the $150. He or she pays
$50 to the teller and keeps the $100.
Authorized Maker Schemes
The most basic way an employee accomplishes an authorized maker scheme is to
override controls designed to prevent fraud. Most authorized signatories have high levels
of influence within their companies. Usually, the perpetrators will use their influence to
<ieflect questions about fraudulent transactions. Authorized maker schemes involve
majority owners or sole shareholders using their company to pay personal expenses
directly out of company accounts. Or the perpetrator might cut checks directly to
himself, herself, his or her friend, or family. Using fear of job security as a weapon, the
owner can maintain a work environment in which employees are afraid to question these
transactions.
Check Tampering Red Flags
The following signs may indicate fraud:
• Voided checks may indicate employees have embezzled cash and charged the
embezzlement to expense accounts. When the expense is paid (from accounts
payable), fraudulent checks are marked and entered as void and removed from
the list of outstanding checks. An account balancing journal entry is then
made. The list of voided checks should be verified against physical copies of
the checks. Bank statements should be reviewed to ensure that voided checks
have not been processed.
• Missing checks may indicate lax control over the physical safekeeping of
checks. Stop payments should be issued for all missing checks.
• Checks payable to employees, with the exception of regular payroll checks,
should be reviewed closely. Such an examination may indicate other schemes
such as conflicts of interest, fictitious vendors, or duplicate expense
reimbursements.
• Altered endorsements or dual endorsements of returned checks may indicate
possible tampering.
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Major Compromises in the Accounts Payable System:
• Lack of segregation of duties for personnel in the accounting and data
processing functions is at the heart ofmost cash disbursement fraud cases.
• Employees and outside vendors, with help from accounts payable workers,
cause compromises in the accounts payable system.
• Employees with too many duties are able to compromise the entity's internal
controls in the accounts payable system.
Payroll Fraud
In payroll schemes, perpetrators falsify timesheets and alter information in the payroll
records. The most common payroll schemes are the ghost employee schemes, falsified
hours and salary schemes, and sales commission schemes. The ghost employee refers to
someone on the payroll who does not actually work for the victim organization. Through
the, falsification of personnel or payroll records a fraudster causes paychecks to be
generated to a ghost. The following four things must happen in order for a ghost
employee scheme to work: 1) the ghost must be added to the payroll system; 2)
timekeeping and wage rate information must be collected; 3) a paycheck must be issued
to the ghost; and 4) the check must be delivered to the perpetrator or an accomplice.
Example
A manager who was responsible for hiring and scheduling janitorial work added over 80
ghost employees to his payroll. The ghosts in this case were actual people who worked at
other jobs for different companies. The manager filled out time sheets for the fictitious
employees and authorized them, then took the resulting paychecks to the ghost
employees, who cashed them and split the proceeds with the manager. It was this
manager's authority in the hiring and supervision of employees that enabled him to
perpetrate this fraud. [Joseph T. Wells, Occupational Fraud and Abuse, (Obsidian,
1997).]
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Example
An employee in the payroll department was given the authority to enter new employees
into the payroll system, make corrections to payroll information, and distribute
paychecks. This employee's manager gave rubber stamp approval to the employee's
actions because of a trusting relationship between the two. The lack of separation of
duties and the absence of review made it simple for the culprit to add a fictitious
employee into the payroll system. [Joseph T. Wells, Occupational Fraud and Abuse,
(Obsidian, 1997).]
Detection of Payroll Schemes:
• Independent Payroll Distribution - Having personnel (other than the payroll
department) distribute the payroll checks, and require positive identification of
the payee.
• Analysis of Payee Address or Accounts - Search for duplicate addresses or
deposit accounts.
• Duplicate Identification Numbers - Search for duplicate social security
numbers.
• Overtime Authorization - Require employees to have overtime authorized by
a supervisor, have the supervisor be responsible for the timesheet, and have
the supervisor refer the timesheet directly to payroll.
• Analysis of Deductions from Payroll Checks - Review payroll withholdings;
ghost employees often will have no withholding taxes, insurance, or other
normal deductions.
Prevention of Payroll Schemes
There are two basic prevention measures for payroll related fraud: segregation of duties
and periodic payroll review and analysis. The following duties should be segregated:
• Payroll preparation
• Payroll disbursement (into payroll and withholding tax accounts)
• Payroll distribution
• Payroll bank reconciliation
• Human resources departmental functions
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Why Does Fraud Occur?
One theory suggests that people engage in fraudulent activity as a result of an interaction
of forces both within an individual's personality and the external environment. These
forces are divided into three major categories:
• Situational Pressures
• Available Opportunities
• Personal Characteristics (Integrity)
Typically, a person with a high level of personal integrity and limited opportunity or
pressure to commit fraud is most likely to behave honestly. In contrast, an individual
with less personal integrity, when placed in situations with increasing pressure and
opportunities, is more likely to commit fraud.
Red-flag Check List To Detect Possible Fraudulent Activity:
• Do any of your employees have unusually high personal debt?
• Do any of your employees appear to be living beyond their means?
• Do any of your employees engage in habitual gambling?
• Do any of your employees appear to abuse alcohol or drugs?
• Do any of your employees appear to lack personal codes of ethics?
• Do any of your employees appear to be unstable (e.g., have frequent job or
residence changes or mental or emotional problems)?
• Is your entity experiencing a tight budget?
• Does your organization use several different banks?
• Do any employees have close associations with suppliers?
• Is the organization experiencing a rapid turnover of key employees, either
through quitting or being fired?
• Is the organization dominated by one or two individuals?
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Conclusion
Occupational fraud is one of the most serious problems facing local governments in
South Carolina. While the rate of occupational fraud is difficult to measure, evidence
suggests that the incidents are vastly underreported. Cash is obviously the asset most
targeted by perpetrators. Organizations are most vulnerable when cash is collected and
when it is disbursed. Therefore, proper oversight of the revenue and disbursement cycle
is the key to controlling cash fraud.
Internal controls are the best deterrent to occupational fraud. The following
minimum procedures are recommended for organizations: do not allow the same
employee to keep books, collect funds, write checks, and reconcile the bank account;
have the monthly bank statement delivered unopened to the finance director, who should
review it for unusual transactions; and consider an annual independent review of internal
controls.
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Appendix A
PUBLIC SECTOR FRAUD SURVEY
I am a candidate in the South Carolina Certified Public Manager's Program (CPM). I am
conducting an occupational fraud survey focusing on local governments in South
Carolina.
The term "occupational fraud" may be defined as: "The use of one's occupation for
personal enrichment through the deliberate misuse or misapplication of the employing
organization's resources or assets.
Please take a few moments to complete the survey.
1. Has a case of occupational fraud occurred within the last 15 years in your entity?
2. What was the cost of the fraud detected or reported?
3. Please classify the occupational fraud into one of the following categories:
* Asset misappropriations, which involve the theft or misuse of an \
organization's assets. (Common examples include skimming revenues, stealing
inventory, and payroll fraud.)
* Corruption, in which fraudsters wrongfully use their influence in a business
transaction in order to procure some benefit for themselves or another person,
contrary to their employer or the rights of another. (Common examples include
accepting kickbacks and engaging in conflicts of interest.)
* Fraudulent statements, with generally involve falsification of an
organization's financial statements. (Common examples include overstating
revenues and understating liabilities or expenses.)
4. How long did the fraud scheme run before it was detected?
5. How was the fraud detecting (by accident, tip from employee, internal audit,
external audit, or anonymous tip)?
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6. . Based on your experience which measures are most helpful in preventing fraud in
your organization?
7. What position did the perpetrator hold within the organization?
8. What was the gender of the perpetrator?
9. What was the age of the perpetrator?
-
10. What was the level ofeducation of the perpetrator?
11. Was the perpetrator charged and prosecuted? Ifnot, why?
12. In your organization did the fraud schemes succeed because of a lack of controls
or did they succeed because preventive controls were ignored?
13. Was the organization able to recovery any of the losses?
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